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Abstract
Scalar inference is the phenomenon whereby the use of a less informative term (e.g., some of) is inferred to mean the
negation of a more informative term (e.g., to mean not all of). Default processing accounts assume that the interpretation of
some of as meaning not all of is realized easily and automatically (regardless of context), whereas context-driven processing
accounts assume that it is realized effortfully and only in certain contexts. In the present study, participants’ self-paced
reading times were recorded as they read vignettes in which the context did or did not bias the participants to make a
scalar inference (to interpret some of as meaning not all of). The reading times suggested that the realization of the
inference was influenced by the context, but did not provide evidence for processing cost at the time the inference is
realized, contrary to the predictions of context-driven processing accounts. The results raise the question of why inferencing
occurs only in certain contexts if it does not involve extra processing effort.
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Introduction
Language comprehension involves rapid integration of various
types of meaning, including coming from words and phrases
themselves (i.e., semantic information) and that coming from
extra-linguistic inferences about what a speaker must intend to
express with an utterance (i.e., pragmatic information). Although
this sort of integration is ubiquitous in natural language use, the
dynamics of semantic and pragmatic meaning computation are
not well understood. Particularly, there is ongoing debate
regarding whether speakers compose inferential pragmatic aspects
of meaning immediately and effortlessly, or whether they first
compose the semantic meaning and then integrate pragmatic
information at a later processing stage.
One test case for investigating this question is scalar inference, the
phenomenon whereby the use of a weaker term (e.g., some of) is
inferred to mean the negation of a stronger term (e.g., to mean not
all of). Consider the exchange in (1):
1) a. Are all of the students in your department hardworking?
b. Some of them are.
(1b) is often understood as meaning ‘‘No, not all of them are.’’
This interpretation, however, is not part of the inherent semantics
of the quantifier some of. Rather, ‘‘not all’’ is thought to be a
meaning that is generated through a pragmatic enrichment
process [1]: a hearer expects that a cooperative speaker will use
the most informative term possible, and thus the speaker’s choice
not to use the stronger term all of must mean that the stronger term
is not true–in other words, that some of means ‘‘not all of’’ [1], [2].
On the other hand, the inherent, semantic meaning of some of is ‘‘at
least one’’, and could be consistent with all of. The fact that the
pragmatic interpretation (‘‘not all’’) is an enriched meaning and
not part of the basic semantic meaning (‘‘at least one’’) is evident
from the fact that the pragmatic interpretation can be cancelled
(e.g., in 2a) without resulting in a nonsensical sentence [3], whereas
the semantic meaning cannot (e.g., 2b):
2) a. Some of the students in this department are hardworking.
In fact, all of them are.
b. Some of the students in this department are hardwork-
ing. #In fact, none of them are.
There are competing psycholinguistic accounts regarding how
the pragmatic meanings of scalar terms like some of are realized
online (for reviews, see [4], [5]). Broadly speaking, context-driven
models [1] assume that realizing a scalar inference requires extra
effort (inferring the speaker’s intentions), whereas default models [6]
hold that the inference-based pragmatic meaning is realized
effortlessly and automatically. Context-driven models predict that,
because the parser avoids exerting extra effort, scalar inferences
are only realized in contexts where they are relevant, and thus the
inference does not occur until after the context and the semantic
meaning of an utterance have been processed. Default models, on
the other hand, predict that inferencing is context-independent
and occurs immediately.
We note that there is not universal agreement on whether the
inference-based meaning of some of is pragmatic, as claimed
above; a grammatical account of scalar inference [7] argues that
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the ‘‘not all’’ meaning is realized through the insertion of an
operator at the logical form of the sentence and thus is still
semantics-based. Under such an account, scalar inference is not a
case of pragmatic processing, but the questions raised above
(specifically, the default or context-based nature of the process
subserving the realization of the enriched meaning of some of) are
still relevant regardless of whether the locus of such an operation is
pragmatic or semantic.
Most psycholinguistic studies testing these models have focused
on the speed at which scalar inferences occur (see, e.g., [4], [8–
10]). Little is known, however, about whether inferences entail a
processing cost. More direct empirical evidence for or against
processing costs in scalar inferencing is necessary if we are to
understand how meaning is realized during online comprehension.
As the predictions of the default and context-driven processing
models rely upon their assumptions about whether inferencing is
effortful, data regarding the speed of inferencing is not sufficient to
adjudicate between these models; data regarding the costs of
inferencing are also needed. In short, our understanding of the
psychology of inferencing cannot be complete without an account
of the processing costs involved.
There is some evidence that the availability of processing
resources influences comprehenders’ offline judgments of sentenc-
es with scalar terms [11], [12]. Studies using speeded verification
have shown that comprehenders often take longer to evaluate
inference-based readings of scalars than semantic readings [13],
[14], [10] (but see [15]). The results of some of these studies are
difficult to draw conclusions from, however, given that the
responses could have been influenced both by time to realize the
inference and time to verify or reject the different meanings [4].
Few studies have attempted to directly measure processing costs
elicited by scalar terms during online comprehension. Such a study
would involve presenting comprehenders with scalar terms in
contexts where the inference is made and those where it is not, and
comparing their processing of these terms using some measure that
is sensitive to the occurrence of greater processing effort, such as
reading times [16]. Breheny, Katsos, and Williams ([17]; hereafter
‘‘BKW’’) performed such an experiment: they compared reading
times to the Greek equivalent of some of in contexts that bias
readers towards making the implicature (‘‘upper-bound’’ contexts,
where what is relevant to the discourse is whether not all is true,
and thus some of is likely to be interpreted as not all of) and in
contexts that do not (‘‘lower-bound’’ contexts, where what is
relevant is whether any is true, and thus some of is unlikely to be
interpreted as not all); see the examples in (3).
3) a. Upper-bound: Mary asked John whether he intended
to host all of his relatives in his tiny apartment. John
replied that he intended to host some of his relatives.
The rest would stay in a nearby hotel.
b. Lower-bound: Mary was surprised to see John cleaning
his apartment and she asked the reason why. John told
her that he intended to host some of his relatives.
The rest would stay in a nearby hotel.
BKW found slower reading times to some of in the upper-bound
(inference-supporting) context, and interpreted that as evidence
that realizing the inference involves extra processing effort. Their
contexts, however, differed in more ways than boundedness–in
particular, the phrase ‘‘his relatives’’ in the critical region is
repeated in the upper-bound context (and thus is infelicitous, since
a pronoun would be expected), whereas it is new in the lower-
bound context (see similar arguments in [4]). Thus, it is
questionable whether the reading time slowdown observed by
BKW is evidence for additional processing involved in realizing an
inference, or is due to unrelated factors.
The present study tests whether the realization of a scalar
inference triggers processing costs, by adopting the design of BKW
but using maximally similar upper- and lower-bound contexts. In
this study, the only difference between the contexts is whether the
context sentence uses the quantifier all (as in the upper-bound
example in (3)) or any. Including all in the context makes the upper
bound relevant in the discourse and thus encourages the
comprehender to interpret some of as not all of, whereas any makes
the upper bound irrelevant and discourages the inference.
Furthermore, to verify whether the inference is ultimately realized,
we follow BKW in including a sentence with ‘‘the rest’’ after the
critical sentence with some of. If the reader has interpreted some of as
meaning not all of, then she is aware of a remaining set of referents
(e.g. ‘‘relatives’’) and thus more easily able to link ‘‘the rest’’ with a
referent. Therefore, faster reading times at ‘‘the rest’’ in the upper-
bound than the lower-bound context indicate that the inference
has been realized in the upper-bound but not the lower-bound
context. ‘‘The rest’’ also provides a secondary test of the speed of
inferencing. Hartshorne and Snedeker (unpublished data; hereaf-
ter H&S), examining another kind of context manipulation, found
faster reading times at ‘‘the rest’’ in the inference-supporting
context when ‘‘the rest’’ appeared about 2500 ms after the
quantifier but not when it appeared about 900 ms after; the
authors took this as evidence that the inference takes over 900 ms
to realize.
In the current study, we provide evidence that realizing scalar
inferences does not trigger a processing cost, as reading times to
the quantifier did not differ between contexts that encourage the
reader to make the inference and contexts that do not, even
though the inference was eventually realized in the inference-
encouraging context and not the inference-discouraging context
(as evidenced by reading times at ‘‘the rest’’).
Methods
Ethics Statement
The procedures used in this study were approved by the Human
Subjects Committee of Lawrence (#20261).
Participants
Twenty-eight native English speakers from the University of
Kansas (20 women; ages 18–56, median 19) participated in the
study for payment. Participants provided their written informed
consent.
Materials
Forty-eight sets of four-sentence vignettes were constructed
following the template in (4); slashes indicate how the vignettes
were divided into segments for the self-paced reading task (see
Procedure). A full list of materials is available as File S1 in the
online supplementary materials for this article.
4) a. Upper-bound some: Mary was preparing to throw a
party for John’s relatives./She asked John whether all
of them were staying in his apartment./John said that/
some of them/were./He added/that/the rest/would
be/staying/in a hotel.
b. Lower-bound some: Mary was preparing to throw a
party for John’s relatives./She asked John whether any of
them were staying in his apartment./John said that/
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some of them/were./He added/that/the rest/would be/
staying/in a hotel.
c. Upper-bound only some: Mary was preparing to
throw a party for John’s relatives./She asked John
whether all of them were staying in his apartment./John
said that/only some of them/were./He added/that/the
rest/would be/staying/in a hotel.
d. Lower-bound only some: Mary was preparing to
throw a party for John’s relatives./She asked John
whether any of them were staying in his apartment./John
said that/only some of them/were./He added/that/the
rest/would be/staying/in a hotel.
In each set, the first sentence establishes a set of items or people
(e.g., John’s relatives). The second sentence establishes an upper-
or lower-bound context by asking about either all of them or any of
them. The third sentence includes a response to the previous
indirect question, using some of, which is predicted to be interpreted
as not all in the upper-bound (since ‘‘all’’ is relevant in that context,
but was not used) but not the lower-bound context (since ‘‘all’’ is
not relevant in that context). Finally, the fourth sentence includes a
mention of the rest of the set. ‘‘The rest’’ was always followed by
‘‘would be’’ and two or three more segments of one or more words
each. The only difference between contexts is the use of all or any
in the second sentence.
In addition to manipulating the boundedness of the context, we
also manipulated the quantificational expression in the third
sentence. Each of the vignette types above also has a counterpart
written using only some of rather than some of (see (4)); serving to
make the not all interpretation semantically explicit. This is
important because comparing reading times between sentences in
which the quantifier was interpreted pragmatically and those in
which the quantifier was interpreted semantically involves
comparing across sentences with different meanings, which may
take different amounts of time or effort to interpret or verify (see
[10]). A control comparison is needed to isolate these other factors
from pragmatic inferencing. If a difference between upper- and
lower-bound conditions is due to pragmatic inferencing rather
than other factors, then that difference should appear in the
implicit upper-bound (some of) sentences but not in the explicit
upper-bound (only some of) sentences.
In addition to the critical stimuli, 144 filler vignettes were
created. Forty-eight follow the same format as the critical
sentences but do not include the rest; this is both to make sure
participants cannot predict the rest in every item and to make sure
that some of is not always associated with the rest (which is an explicit
cue to the inference). Forty-eight use all of rather than some of or
only some of in the third sentence, to make sure participants cannot
predict some of or only some of in every item; these items also do not
include the rest. The last 48 use various other quantifiers in the third
sentence (many of, most of, several of, a few of, none of, and numbers) to
increase the variety of lexical alternatives to some of present in the
experimental context, which has been shown to influence the
speed and outcome of scalar inferencing [9].
Procedure
Participants read the vignettes in a non-cumulative moving-
window self-paced reading paradigm [16], administered using the
Presentation software package (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). In
each trial, the passage was shown on the screen with all the
characters replaced with dashes; the participant pressed a button
on a gamepad to show a phrase (at which point the dashes were
replaced with the phrase). With each button press, the currently
displayed phrase turned back into dashes and the next phrase was
displayed. Participants were instructed to read the sentences for
comprehension at a natural reading speed. One-third of the
sentences were followed by comprehension questions, e.g. ‘‘Who
was Mary throwing a party for?’’ The comprehension questions
never targeted aspects of the passage that depend upon the
interpretation of quantifiers. The main experiment was preceded
by eight practice items. The procedure took 40–50 minutes to
complete, with five breaks.
Data Analysis
Reading times for filler items and for the first two segments of
the critical items (the context segments which were presented as
entire sentences) were excluded from all analyses. The remaining
reading times were log-transformed for normality, and outliers for
each participant and item removed based on visual inspection.
(This method of outlier trimming is recommended by [18]. The
pattern of results reported below was also observed using other
outlier-trimming methods such as a flat criterion as in H&S, a
subject-wise standard deviation criterion, and a hybrid method
based on that described in BKW–first removing observations
below 150 ms or greater than 3 times the overall mean of
observations in a given region, then removing observations that
differ by more than three standard deviations from that subject’s
mean for that region.) Linear mixed models with random
intercepts for participants and items [19] were fit with predictors
Quantifier (some, only some), Boundedness (upper, lower), and sentence
Region, and model comparison was conducted with log-likelihood
tests. Accuracy was analyzed using generalized linear mixed
models with predictors Quantifier and Boundedness. Evaluation of
the significance of model coefficients was conducted using Markov
Chain Monte Carlo sampling. All data are available in File S2 in
the online version of this article.
Results
Accuracy
Participants responded correctly to 93.8% of items in the upper-
bound some condition, 90.2% in lower-bound some, 94.6% in
upper-bound only some, and 91.1% in lower-bound only some. There
were no significant differences in accuracy across conditions and
no interaction (x2s,2.3, ps..130).
Reading Times
Figure 1 shows the reading times for the last two sentences of
the vignettes. It is evident that, for some sentences, ‘‘the rest’’ was
read more slowly in the lower-bounded context, whereas such a
pattern was not observed in only some sentences. It is also apparent
that there is no slowdown at the quantifier in some sentences in the
upper-bound context. Statistical analysis confirmed these obser-
vations.
After outlier removal (see Data analysis), 12,105 observations
remained for analysis. Standard deviations for the random effects
in the saturated model were as follows: Items: 0.038; Participants:
0.167; Residual: 0.282. There was a significant three-way
interaction between Region, Quantifier, and Boundedness
(x2(9) = 23.10, p = .006). For some sentences, reading times for
‘‘the rest’’ were significantly slower in the lower-bound than
upper-bound context (b = 0.054, SE = 0.022, t = 2.42, p = .014,
95% CI: 0.01–0.097). No significant difference was observed at
‘‘the rest’’ in only some sentences, and the trend was in the opposite
direction (b = 2.030, SE = 0.022, t = 21.37, p = .167, 95% CI:
20.074–0.013). The only regions where only some sentences
showed a boundedness effect were ‘‘that’’ (the region preceding
‘‘the rest’’; b = 20.046, SE = 0.022, t = 22.09, p = .038, 95% CI:
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20.09– 20.003) and the sentence-final region (b = 20.185,
SE = 0.055, t = 223.36, p,.001, 95% CI: 20.293– 20.077). No
significant effect of context was observed at the quantifier (‘‘some
of’’ or ‘‘only some of’’) or the following two regions, either for some
sentences (bs,0.032, SEs.0.022, ts,1.38, ps..291) or for only
some sentences (|b|s,0.021, SEs.0.022, |t|s,0.96, ps..329).
The 95% confidence intervals for these null effects were as follows:
some sentences: 20.02–0.067 (quantifier), 20.023–0.064 (quanti-
fier+1), 20.036–0.05 (quantifier+2); only some sentences: 21.606–
1.57 (quantifier), 20.835–0.816 (quantifier+1), 21.857–1.9 (quan-
tifier+2).
Based on the confidence intervals of the effects, the fact that
significant effects were observed in other predicted places (i.e., at
‘‘the rest’’ in the some sentences), and the fact that the numerical
effect of context at the quantifier position was not even in the same
direction as in BKW, it is not likely that the null effect of context at
the quantifier region could have been due to lack of power.
Nevertheless, we performed a simulation-based post-hoc power
analysis to test whether the design had sufficient power to detect an
effect of similar size if such an effect existed (although the
usefulness of such post-hoc analyses has been challenged [20],
[21]). The analysis revealed an observed power of.981, suggesting
that with the number of participants and items tested we had a
98.1% chance to detect an effect of the size that BKW reported.
Details of this analysis are in Appendix S1.
Because H&S found an effect of context when ‘‘the rest’’
appeared about 2500 ms after the quantifier but not when it
appeared about 900 ms after, we also calculated the lag between
quantifier and ‘‘the rest’’ in the implicit upper-bound (some of)
vignettes. The average lag was 1435 ms. A mixed model on the
reading times at ‘‘the rest’’ and the following region, for the some
sentences only, showed that the effect of context did not interact
with the lag time (x2(2) = 0.48, p = .788), thus not providing
evidence that the effect of context on scalar inferencing emerged
only at long lag times. As illustrated in Figure 2, the effect of
context (at ‘‘the rest’’) remains the same regardless of the lag time.
Discussion
The present results are consistent with previous studies in
showing that a scalar inference is more likely to be made in an
Figure 1. Segment-by-segment reading times. Reading times by region for the last two sentences in some vignettes (panel A) and only some
vignettes (panel B). Regions showing a significant effect of boundedness for a given quantifier type are indicated with an asterisk. Error bars represent
6.5 standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063943.g001
Figure 2. Reading time vs. lag time. Relationship between reading
times on ‘‘the rest’’ and lag between the quantifier and ‘‘the rest’’ for
upper-bound (dots and solid line) and lower-bound (triangle and
dashed line) contexts. Points represent individual observations, and
regression lines represent predictions from a mixed model with fixed
effects of Boundedness, Lag Time, and their [non-significant] interac-
tion. The bottom and left axes show log lag time and log reading time
respectively, and the top and right axes show raw lag time and raw
reading time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063943.g002
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upper-bound than a lower-bound context, as ‘‘the rest’’ was read
faster in the former context. However, contrary to BKW, the
quantifier ‘‘some of’’ and the following words were not read more
slowly in the upper-bound context. Since previous studies (BKW,
[5], [22]) assumed that processing cost associated with inferencing
would result in longer reading times for quantifiers in an inference-
triggering (e.g., upper-bound) compared to a non-inference-
triggering (lower-bound) context, the lack of a slowdown in the
present study challenges the notion that the realization of the
inference was effortful. The present findings suggest that the
reading time slowdown observed by BKW was due to properties of
their stimuli other than the pragmatic manipulation. We also
found the inference occurring earlier than in H&S, failing to
replicate their finding that the effect of context on ‘‘the rest’’ only
emerged at a long lag after the quantifier; this suggests that their
result may be due to other structural properties of the stimuli and
not to the speed of inference (for instance, H&S’s long-lag
conditions included adverbial phrases after the quantifier, while
the short-lag condition did not). Overall, then, the present study
did not provide direct evidence that the realization of a scalar
inference was costly in the context tested.
An anonymous reviewer suggested that the results may be
consistent with context-driven models if one assumes that
comprehenders do not realize the inference until they encounter
language referring to the complement set (‘‘the rest’’). Under such
an account, the lack of reading time difference observed at the
quantifier would be due to the fact that the inference was not
realized in either condition (note that this is different than the
account made in previous self-paced reading studies, which
assumed that the inference would be realized at the quantifier
position in upper-bound context and the extra computations
necessary for realizing the inference would result in increased
reading times). The reading time slowdown at ‘‘the rest’’ in the
lower-bound context, then, would be due to participants’ extra
effort required to integrate the complement set with the preceding
context. We note that such an account would still not provide
direct evidence of processing cost associated with scalar inferen-
cing–rather, it would suggest evidence of avoidance of inferencing
entirely. It does not seem likely that inferences are only realized
when a complement set is mentioned, given that inferences seem
to be derived in sentences with no complement set (e.g., example
(1b) in this article) and there is substantial experimental evidence
for rapid and implicit sensitivity to inference-based meanings even
in the absence of complement sets ([23], [24], among others).
Moreover, anticipatory eye movements reflecting the realization of
inferences have been observed following quantifiers, but before the
mention of a contrast set or any subsequent referring expression
[8], [25].
The present results thus raise questions for context-based
models. While numerous recent studies have suggested that
inferences are realized at a delay except in special contexts (e.g.,
[4], [10], H&S), the traditional explanation for that finding is that
inferencing is effortful and thus the parser avoids inferencing until
after it can evaluate whether the extra effort is worthwhile, or at
least until after the core semantic meaning of the scalar term has
already been realized. If inferencing is not effortful, then a new
explanation for the delay would be needed (see [20], for several
alternative accounts). Alternatively, inferencing may be effortful
but reading times may not be sensitive to this effort–in addition to
the present study, H&S (self-paced reading) and Lewis & Phillips
(unpublished eye-tracking data) have failed to find processing
effort for the quantifier in inference-supporting contexts. If that is
the case, future studies must use other methods to test for different
instantiations of processing costs. This may be accomplished both
using direct measures of processing cost (such as, possibly, event-
related potentials) and via indirect means (such as testing whether
individual differences in various cognitive abilities predict the
extent to which individuals inference online). We believe both
these routes can make important contributions to examining
context-driven accounts of inferencing.
It nevertheless seems unlikely that the lack of a context effect at
the quantifier in the present study is due just to reading times not
being sensitive enough. A recent experiment [22] did find evidence
for a reading time slowdown at the quantifier position in a similar
study, and the effect could not have been due to repeated lexical
items as it was in BKW. This provides evidence that self-paced
reading times can indeed be sensitive to processing effort in scalar
inferencing, making it less likely that the null effect observed in the
present study was simply due to the the dependent measure used.
As [22] used a different context manipulation than this and
previous studies (they manipulated the speaker’s epistemic state,
whereas the present study manipulated information-structural
constraints), the comparison between their findings and the
present results raises the possibility that inferencing may be costly
in certain contexts and not in others. Such a conclusion would be
consistent with the constraint-based account of inferencing [9]
discussed below.
The present study also raises questions for default accounts–
specifically, while a default model could account for the present
findings (by assuming that the inference was effortlessly realized at
‘‘some of’’ and then cancelled in the lower-bound context before
‘‘the rest’’), default models owe an account of the nature of
inference cancellation and the processes that underlie it. [6]
describes two algorithms for determining whether a default
inference will be cancelled. The first involves checking whether
an inference is consistent with the previous context or higher-
ranked information (e.g., in example (2b), the inference ‘‘not all of
the students are hardworking’’ is inconsistent with the explicit
entailment ‘‘all of the students are [hardworking]’’; [5] also make
reference to additional epistemic factors in the context which
could cause an inference to be cancelled or not realized, such as if
a speaker is known to be non-cooperative). The lower-bounded
contexts in the present study would not trigger inference
cancellation from this mechanism, since the inference does not
conflict with information in the sentence or prevent the
comprehender from completing the task (i.e., the question of
‘‘whether any of John’s relatives are staying in his apartment’’ is
answered even if the answer is ‘‘some but not all of them are’’).
Therefore, the fact that the inference was cancelled in lower-
bound contexts before ‘‘the rest’’ (as evidenced by slower reading
times to ‘‘the rest’’ in that context) would have to be explained
through the second cancellation mechanism described by [6],
whereby inferences that are irrelevant to the goal of the
conversation are discarded. However, BKW (see also [5]) assume
that inference cancellation should involve extra effort, and some
experimental evidence also suggests that it does [15], [24]. If the
processor avoids unnecessary effort, it is unclear why it would
make the effort to cancel inferences that do not interfere with the
comprehension of the utterance. As suggested by [6], the default
model is lacking a full account of what about this particular
context would cause inference cancellation, and the nature of the
process through which inferences are cancelled; the results of the
present study highlight the need for such an account if the default
Realization of Scalar Inferences
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model is to explain how meaning is realized online in the contexts
tested in this experiment.
The present results may be amenable to the constraint-based
account proposed by [9]. Under this account, scalar inferencing is
a result of rapid integration of multiple constraints, which may
facilitate or inhibit the inference. Unlike traditional context-driven
accounts, this account may predict that inferencing is both
context-sensitive and potentially rapid and effortless. If numerous
constraints strongly facilitate the inference, then realizing the
inference may not require great effort; on the other hand, if
constraints discourage the comprehender from making the
inference, it may not be realized at all. Such a model would be
able to account for seemingly effortless inferencing in contexts like
the upper-bound context of the present study. This is different
from traditional context-driven models, which assume that
inferencing is always costly and therefore that when it does
happen it will be late and effortful. Further study would be useful
to investigate the predictions of a constraint-based account for this
type of paradigm.
In conclusion, the present study raises questions for both default
and context-driven accounts of inferencing, and suggests that
alternative accounts or reformulations of these accounts may be
worth considering. The results also challenge the field to seek
evidence for processing costs in new ways. Both of these endeavors
have the potential to improve our understanding of how
comprehenders compose the meaning of utterances in real-time.
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